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CASE NOTES
rule limiting recovery to those in privity with the defendant would
not come any closer to fulfilling the compensatory purpose, since
many persons with a claim to compensation would go totally
unsatisfied, while only a few would be made whole. It is submitted
that it may be more equitable to provide at least some compensation
for all, rather than full compensation for the few who can establish
privity through the fortuitous matching of buy and sell orders.
Finally, the compensatory function of private damage actions in the
case of open-market violations of the disclose or abstain rule is open
to serious question under either the privity or the Shapiro rule. 82
The court's finding of the Rule 10b-5 violations on the part of
all defendants is clearly supported by reason and authority. How-
ever, there is some question as to whether the authority depended
upon for the imposition of such broad civil liability for damages
supports the court's conclusions. In any case, the result of Shapiro
seems desirable in terms of its effectiveness in fulfilling the purposes
of private actions in Rule 10b-5 cases.
ROGER BRUNELLE
Securities Law—Fraud—Rule 10b-5 Private Actions—Adoption of
Flexible Duty Standard—White v. Abrams '—Defendant, Abrams,
was a trusted friend and investment advisor of plaintiffs, White and
others. Abrams encouraged plaintiffs to make substantial invest-
ments in several corporations which subsequently went bankrupt. 2
The corporations paid Abrams substantial commissions for obtain-
ing the investments. 3 Plaintiffs brought a suit seeking rescission and
punitive damages for violations of section 17(a) of the Securities Act
of 1933, 4 section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 5 SEC
32 Thus, it has been argued that a violation of Rule 10b-5 of the type which occurred in
Shapiro has not really damaged anybody. Note, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 468, 475 (1966); Comment,
16 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 404, 409-10 (1969).
' 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974).
2 Id. at 727.
3 Id.
15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970). Since the relevant language of section 17(a) is almost
identical to the language of Rule 10b-5, the court assumed that the elements of a private
action under that section arc the same as those of 'an action under Rule 10b-5. 495 F.2d at 717
n.2.
5 15 U.S.C.	 78j(b) (1970), which provides in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of
any national securities exchange—. .
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
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Rule 10b-5, 6
 and for common law fraud. The complaint alleged
certain misrepresentations and non-disclosures by Abrams in con-
nection with the investments. A jury found the defendant not liable
under the theory of common law fraud, but returned a verdict for
plaintiffs on the federal securities laws counts and awarded them
compensatory damages.?
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, defendant Abrams argued that
the trial court had improperly instructed the jury on the scope of
duty imposed by clause (b) of Rule 10b-5. The court had instructed
as follows:
If you find that defendant made a material misrep-
resentation to plaintiffs in connection with the sale to
plaintiffs of a promissory note or share of stock, the law is
that defendant has violated the Federal securities laws
even if you find that defendant did not know the falsity of
the misrepresentations he made to plaintiffs.°
The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded. HELD: section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 do not impose liability without fault—the
defendant has no duty to insure the truthfulness of representations
he has made, but will be liable for misrepresentations and omissions
only where he was in some way at fault or culpable. 9 In giving
instructions to the trial court, the Ninth Circuit articulated a
"flexible duty standard" of liability under which "the proper stand-
ard to be applied is the extent of the duty that rule 10b-5 imposes
upon [a] particular defendant." 14 In applying the flexible duty stand-
ard, the trial court was directed to determine what duty of disclo-
sure the law should impose upon a particular defendant. In instruct-
ing the jury on the defendant's duty, the trial court was directed to
require it to consider: (1) the relationship of the defendant to the
plaintiff; (2) the defendant's access to the information as compared
to the plaintiff's access; (3) the benefit derived from the relationship
by the defendant; (4) the defendant's awareness of whether the
plaintiff relied upon their relationship in making the investment
decisions; and (5) the defendant's activity in initiating the securities
6
 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1974), which provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of
any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security.
7
 495 F.2d at 727-28.
Id. at 728.
9 Id.
" Id. at 734-35.
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transaction in question." The Ninth Circuit emphasized that the
trial court may make additions to or adaptations of the above
factors in a particular case."
White v. Abrams offered the Ninth Circuit its first opportunity
to speak on the standard of liability in private actions under Rule
10b-5 since its 1961 and 1962 decisions in Ellis v. Carter" and Royal
Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith,' 4 where it held that common law
fraud need not be alleged or proved in a Rule 10b-5 action.'s After
rejecting the interpretations that it had imposed liability without
fault or for negligence in Ellis and Royal Air, 16 the Ninth Circuit in
White took issue with the Second Circuit's latest formulations of the
standard of Rule 10b-5 liability as expressed in Chris-Craft Indus-
tries, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp. '? and Lanza v. Drexel & Co. 18 It
rejected any discussion of liability in terms of the scienter or state-
of-mind element which has been the focus of the traditional mode of
analysis in Rule 10b-5 cases. Instead, reasoning that a defendant's
duty can only be determined in the context of the specific fact
situation, the Ninth Circuit adopted a "duty analysis," leaving to
the trier of fact the determination of that duty, which could range
from a duty only to avoid intentional fraud to a duty to use extreme
care to disclose all material facts."
This note will initially pinpoint the issues on which the Second
and Ninth Circuits disagree. By way of background.to an examina-
tion of the White standard, there will then be a brief review of the
origin of the controversy over the proper standard of liability in a
private action under Rule 10b-5, a presentation of the Second
Circuit's mode of Rule 10b-5 analysis, focusing upon the state-of-
mind element, and a discussion of the history of the Ninth Circuit's
position on the standard of liability. Proceeding to the White stand-
ard, there will be an examination of its conceptual basis and then
an evaluation of its practical effect.
In White v. Abrams, the Ninth Circuit expressed its disagree-
ment with the Second Circuit on two basic issues arising in the
determination of the standard of liability in private actions under
Rule 10b-5: (1) the proper mode of analysis; and (2) the degree of
culpability or fault required to impose liability on the defendant. 2°
'' Id. at 735-36.
IS
 Id. at 735.
13
 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961).
14
 312 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962).
13
 312 F,2r1 at 212; 291 F.2d at 274.
16
 495 F.2d at 734. The trial judge was not alone in reading Ellis and Royal Air as
imposing liability without fault. E.g., Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255,
313 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972).
17
 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
19
 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir, 1973) (en ham). For a thorough analysis of the Lanza opinion,
see Comment, Lanza v. Drexel & Co. And Rule 1013-5: Approaching The Scienter Con-
troversy In Private Actions, 15 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 526 (1974).
19
 495 F.2d at 732, 734-36.
20 Id. at 734-36.
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The court unequivocally rejected the traditional mode of analysis
which focuses on the state of mind of the defendant. 21 Although
deliberately refusing to espouse "a negligence standard or any other
standard that focuses solely upon state of mind and its various
compartmentalizations,"22 the Ninth Circuit indicated that it per-
ceives a difference between its position on the degree of culpability
and that of the Second Circuit: "We believe it unfortunate that the
Second Circuit attempted to limit [a defendant's] duty by requiring
some degree of scienter or culpability and by holding that mere
negligent conduct would not be sufficient for liability:" 23 Instead of
specifying a single theory of liability under the Rule, the Ninth
Circuit has left the determination of the duty and, implicitly, the
selection of the theory of liability to the trier of fact, thereby allow-
ing the minimum degree of culpability required for the imposition of
liability under the Rule to vary from case to case. 24 It is the thesis of
this note that the issues of the mode of analysis and the requisite
degree of culpability are distinct and that both require resolution in
developing a standard of liability for private actions under Rule
10b-S. Whether a court adopts a duty analysis or a state-of-mind
analysis, it must still come to grips with what degree of culpability if
any—i.e., what single theory of liability—Rule 10b-5 requires.
The. controversy over the proper standard of liability in a
private action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 has resulted from
the absence of a provision in either the statute or the Rule for civil
recovery by a defrauded seller or purchaser. 25 Therefore, neither
specifies a standard of liability to be applied in a private action.
Thus, when the federal courts decided that the statute and Rule
permit a private action and civil liability, 26 they were forced to
determine what degree of culpability, if any, on the part of a
defendant should be required for recovery by the plaintiff.
Since the statute, the Rule, and the SEC's release accompany-
ing the promulgation of the Rule27 all speak in terms of "fraud," the -
Second Circuit looked initially to the common law tort action for
fraud28 as a source of the elements of the private action. 29 The
21
 "[Me reject scienter or any other discussion of state of mind as a necessary and
separate clement of a 10b-5 action." Id. at 734.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 732.
24
 Id. at 735-36.
25 For the language of § 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5, see notes 5 & 6 supra.
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Stipp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
27
 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942), reprinted in 2 A.
Bromberg, Securities Law: Fraud—SEC Rule 10b-5, App. B, at 295 (1973).
" The traditional elements of common law fraud are: scienter, materiality, reliance,
causation, and damages. See W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts, § 105, at 685-86
(4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as W. Prosser].
29
 We think that when, to conduct actionable under § 11 of the 1933 Act, there is
added the ingredient of fraud, then that conduct becomes actionable under 10(b) of
518
CASE NOTES
necessity of expanding the common law concept of fraud for the
purposes of Rule 10b-5 arose, however, when the Second Circuit
was faced with the complex fact situation in SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co. 3 ° Texas Gulf Sulphur was an enforcement proceeding
brought by the SEC against a number of company executives,
employees, relatives, friends, brokers, and attorneys for trading in
the stock of the company at various times before and shortly after
the public disclosure of the company's discovery of an extremely
rich ore deposit. The wide range of culpability among the Texas
Gulf Sulphur defendants forced the Second Circuit to reconcile the
existing requirement of fraud 3 ' with the need to impose liability for
conduct that, although lacking the intent to defraud necessary for
strict common law scienter, was clearly contrary to the basic inves-
tor-protection policies of the federal securities laws. 32 Judge Water-
man, speaking for the court, reduced the requirement of the state-
of-mind element from strict intent to defraud to a minimum of "lack
of diligence, constructive fraud, or unreasonable or negligent con-
duct . . . ." 33 Reacting against Judge Waterman's implication that
Rule 10b-5 imposes liability for negligent conduct, Judge Friendly,
in a concurring opinion, emphasized that Texas Gulf Sulphur was an
enforcement proceeding and agreed that negligence would be
sufficient to justify an injunction. However, he argued that the
imposition of civil liability for mere negligence would go beyond the
statutory authorization of section 10(b). 34
The Second Circuit attempted to resolve the controversy in
1971 in Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill & Co. 35 There, it held that
"Nit is insufficient to allege mere negligence." 36
 By requiring allega-
tions of facts amounting to "scienter, intent to defraud, reckless
disregard for the truth, or knowing use of a device, scheme or
artifice to defraud,"37 the court indicated that intent, as opposed to
negligence, is the proper theory of liability in a private Rule 10b-5
action. Subsequently, in 1973, in Lanza v. Drexel & Ca.," the
Second Circuit announced that liability under Rule 10b-S would be
imposed only for willful or reckless disregard for the truth, 39 for
which the test would be whether the defendant "knew the material
the 1934 Act and the Rule, at the suit of any defrauded person, whether or not he
could maintain a suit under § 11 of the 1933 Act.
Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 786-87 (2d Cir. 1951).
30 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
31 See Fischman, 188 F.2d at 786-87. See note 29 supra.
12
 401 F.2d at 855.
" Id.
34
 Id. at 868 (concurring opinion).
15
 448 F.2d 442 (2d Cir. 1971).
36 Id. at 445.
37 Id .
38 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973) (en bane).
39 Id. at 1306.
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facts misstated or omitted, or failed or refused, after being put on
notice of a possible material failure of disclosure, to apprise [himself]
of the facts where [he] could have done so without any extraordinary
effort."" The requirement that the defendant have been put on
notice indicates that the Second Circuit defines recklessness as a
form of intentional conduct, and that the court requires a conscious
awareness and disregard of a recognizable risk of harm on the part
of a defendant in order to subject him to liability under the statute
and Rule.
The Ninth Circuit's enigmatic decision in Ellis v. Carter• and
its affirmation in Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith 42 present a
sharp contrast to the development of a standard of liability in the
Second Circuit based on the state-of-mind element.
Ellis was a Rule 10b-5 action brought by a purchaser of se-
curities who alleged that he had purchased shares from the defend-
ant at higher than the market price in reliance upon defendant's
false representation that the stock carried with it a voice in the
management of the company. The court declined to hold that plain-
tiff must allege and ultimately prove "genuine fraud." 43
Section 10(b) speaks in terms of the use of "any manipula-
tive device or contrivance" in contravention of rules and
regulations as might be prescribed by the Commission. It
would have been difficult to frame the authority to pre-
scribe regulations in broader terms. Had Congress in-
tended to limit this authority to regulations proscribing
common-law fraud, it would probably have said so. We
see no reason to go beyond the plain meaning of the word
"any", indicating that the use of manipulative or deceptive
devices or contrivances of whatever kind may be forbid-
den, to construe the statute as if it read "any fraudulent"
devices,"
It was this language, as the court noted in White, 45 that caused
confusion over the Ninth Circuit's standard of liability and, pre-
sumbly, that prompted the trial judge in White to instruct the jury
that Rule 10b-5 imposes liability without fault, i.e., without proof
that the defendant knew the falsity of the misrepresentation or
omission . 46
Subsequent to Ellis, in Royal Air, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed
4°
 Id. at 1306 n.98. While the majority seemed to have no doubt that the Second Circuit
had resolved the scienter versus negligence controversy, Judge Hays argued in a dissenting
opinion that the issue had not yet been settled and indicated that he favored the imposition of
liability for mere negligence. Id. at 1311, 1319 (dissenting opinion).
41
 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961).
42 312 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962).
43 291 F.2d at 274.
44 Id.
4 ' 495 F.2d at 729-30.
46 See id. at 728.
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its position that common law fraud need not be alleged or proved to
recover in a Rule 10b-5 case and clarified the meaning of the
above-quoted language from Ellis. The court explained that "Rule
10b-5 . . . only requires proof of a material misstatement or an
omission of a material fact in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security to make out a prima facie case."'" However, the court
did not delineate a standard of liability for ultimate recovery.
In the White opinion, the Ninth Circuit emphasized that Royal
Air merely expressed the standard applicable to motions to dismiss
or for a directed verdict at the end of plaintiff's case, and did not
articulate the standard for recovery. 48
 With the benefit of this
clarification, it is possible to interpret Ellis and Royal Air as holding
simply that the Ninth Circuit does not require proof of strict com-
mon law fraud, in the sense of intent to deceive, for liability under
Rule 10b-5.
In White, the Ninth Circuit repudiated the traditional analysis
in Rule 10b-5 cases by adopting the flexible duty standard. The
court's avowed rationale for this break was the unworkability of a
single standard in the varied factual contexts arising in Rule 10b-5
cases. 49
The way in which the Ninth Circuit's analysis under Rule
10b-5 differs from that of the Second Circuit is revealed by a
comparison of the two courts' treatments of the concept of duty.
Although the Second Circuit has not formulated its standard of
liability in terms of duty, it is possible to express the reckless
disregard standard in terms of the duty it imposes, since the concept
of duty is merely a shorthand statement of the conclusion of whether
a plaintiff's interests are entitled to legal protection from the conduct
of the defendant." Thus, the Second Circuit recognizes first a duty
that is fixed and objective: to disclose material facts actually known
to the defendant. 5 ' In order to promote the policies of the federal
securities laws, there are additional facts that a defendant is pre-
sumed to know. From this conclusion, there arises a subordinate
duty of investigation to discover material facts requiring disclosure.
Under the reckless—disregard standard, this duty of investigation
is imposed where the defendant is, in some way, put on notice of a
possible failure of disclosure of a material fact. 52
In contrast to the fixed, objective duty of the defendant in the
Second Circuit's mode of analysis, the analysis adopted by the Ninth
47
 312 F.2d at 212 (emphasis added).
4I4
 495 F.2d at 730.
44 Id .
5"
 W. Prosser, supra note 28, * 53, at 325.
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 848.
12
 Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F,2d at 1306 n.98.
521
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERICAL LAW REVIEW
Circuit results in a flexible duty that will vary with each fact
situation: "[T]he proper standard to be applied is the extent of the
duty that Rule 10b-5 imposes on this particular defendant." 53 The
particular duty imposed upon a defendant is to be determined by
focusing "on the goals of the securities fraud legislation by consider-
ing a number of factors that have been found to be significant in
securities transactions." 54
 Although it is not clear from the White
opinion whether, in a jury trial, the court or the jury is to make this
determination, 55
 the subsequent 1974 decision by the Ninth Circuit
in Marx v. Computer Sciences Corp. 56
 indicates that the question of
the defendant's duty is to be left to the jury. 57
By leaving the question of a defendant's duty to the trier of
fact, the court in White has avoided specifying a single theory of
liability under Rule lob-5. Indeed, by providing that the "standard"
is the "duty,"58
 the Ninth Circuit has in fact avoided specifying any
standard at all by which a defendant's duty may be measured.
Moreover, by its failure to provide any guidance to the trial court in
instructing the jury on the requisite degree of culpability, the court
has formulated a "standard" that will allow the theory of liability to
vary in each case: the court indicated that the flexible duty may vary
from "a duty to use extreme care in assuring that all material
information is accurate and disclosed" 59
 to "only [a] duty . . . not to
misrepresent intentionally material facts.""
It is difficult to predict how the White standard will operate in
practice. The factors that the Ninth Circuit enumerated in White
—relation between the parties, relative access to information,
benefit derived by defendant, defendant's awareness of plaintiffs
reliance, and defendant's initiative in the transaction 61—merely call
the attention of the trier of fact to the categories of facts that will be
determinative of liability, without giving the trier any guidance in
making that determination. Having considered these factors, which
will be present in any securities transaction, and arrived at a score
on each factor, the only formula that the trier of fact will have for
combining those scores to yield a yes-or-no decision on liability is:
"[t]he . . standard . . is the extent of the duty. "62
Thus, under the flexible duty standard, juries in the Ninth
Circuit will have to rely ultimately on their basic sense of fairness,
53
 495 F.2d at 734-35.
3.8
 Id. at 735. The factors are set out in the text at note 11 supra.
55
 In one paragraph, the court says:,"In making this determination the court should focus
. ," while in the next paragraph the court directs: "we feel the court should ... require the
jury to consider the [Factors) . . . ." Id. (emphasis added).
56 507 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1974).
31 Id. at 490.
58
 See text at note 53 supra.
" 495 F.2d at 736.
6° Id.
• hi Id. at 735-36.
62
 Id. at 734-35. See text at note 53 supra.
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i.e., of what it is reasonable to require of a defendant. However,
since a jury will have no formula for balancing the factors, it may
conceivably impose liability for a high score on any single factor. As
a result of this discretion, persons engaged in securities transactions
will have to reckon with a de facto negligence standard of liability
under Rule 10b-5, with the option available to defense counsel at
trial of arguing for the imposition of liability only for more culpable
conduct in a particular case. For, although a defendant might
succeed at trial in persuading the trier of fact that his duty was only
to avoid intentional misrepresentation, it will be unwise for persons
engaged in securities transactions, anxious to avoid liability, to fail
to make a reasonable investigation in all cases, since juries will have
the option of holding them to a negligence standard,
The overly broad discretion vested in juries and the resultant
uncertainty for persons engaged in securities transactions are the
practical effects of the theoretical deficiencies of the flexible duty
standard. It would be logical to adopt a negligence approach and
thereby to conclude that a defendant's duty will vary with the fact
situation. This would merely recognize that, in negligence cases, the
jury determines the particular standard by deciding whether the
defendant has exercised the ordinary care of a reasonable man under
the particular circumstances. However, it is something quite differ-
ent to allow the jury to impose liability, on the ground of breach of a
duty, upon one defendant for failure to exercise ordinary care and
upon another only for injury inflicted upon the plaintiff intention-
ally. It is always the function of the jury, in a negligence case, to
determine the degree of diligence required of a defendant in order to
qualify his conduct as that of a reasonable man under the
circumstances. 63
 It is never the function of the jury, however, to
choose the theory of liability, i.e., negligence or intent." The Sec-
ond Circuit's debate over liability for scienter versus negligence was
necessary since the statute and Rule leave room for disagreement as
to whether Congress intended to impose liability only for fraudulent
intent or for negligence as well.
That recklessness and negligence are not absolutes, capable of
being objectively applied, is well illustrated by the three opinions in
Lanza. Judge Moore, speaking for the court, concluded that the
circumstances Shown by the record were not sufficient as a matter of
law to put the outside director, Coleman, on notice of a possible
material failure of disclosure." Judge Hays, in a dissenting opinion,
argued that the imposition of liability for negligence was appropriate
for the protection of investors, and that Coleman's conduct was
negligent. 66
 Judge Timbers, in another dissent, also thought that
Coleman should be liable, but on the ground that his conduct
63 W. Prosser, supra note 28, § 37, at 207.
" Id. § 37, at 206.
65
 Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1289 (2d Cir. 1973) (en bane).
66
 Id. at 1319 (dissenting opinion).
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showed reckless disregard for the truth. 67
 Thus, Judge Hays and
Judge Timbers found that liability should be imposed, but disagreed
on whether the same body of facts showed negligence or reckless
disregard for the truth.
Despite the disagreement that specific fact situations may gen-
erate, it is imperative, in view of the two distinct theories of liability
of which Rule 10b-5 arguably admits, that the Ninth Circuit choose
between the theories and not leave the question to the jury. Al-
though recklessness and negligence are boundaries of a spectrum of
conduct rather than absolute standards," nevertheless, it is essential
that the Ninth Circuit indicate to the lower courts its preference for
one end of the spectrum in formulating a standard of liability for
private actions under Rule 10b-5. Once the court of appeals has
chosen between the recklessness end of the spectrum and the negli-
gence end, there remains the problem of articulating a standard of
liability in Rule 10b-5 cases, that is, a verbal formula that will be
flexible enough to accomplish the goals of the statute and Rule in a
wide range of fact situations while specifically directing the trier of
fact to impose liability only on the basis of the chosen theory.
Herein lies the strength of the Second Circuit's mode of
analysis: its effectiveness in balancing the criteria of flexibility and
specificity. The Second Circuit's latest formulation of the state-of-
mind element is whether the defendant "knew the material facts
misstated or omitted, or failed or refused, after being put on notice
of a possible material failure of disclosure, to apprise [himself] of the
facts when [he] could have done so without any extraordinary
effort."69
 The requirement of notice specifies to the jury that some
degree of awareness is required for the imposition of liability. Fur-
thermore, the formulation in terms of notice is sufficiently flexible to
encompass the variety of fact situations arising under Rule 10b-5.
Although the sufficiency of certain information to put a defendant
on notice will vary, depending upon factors similar to those which
the Ninth Circuit enumerated in White," the concept of notice is
broad enough to allow a jury to weigh these factors in a specific fact
situation without resort to what the Ninth Circuit called "jamming
facts together in an effort to fit the concept." 71
Although the Ninth Circuit's flexible duty standard is not
sufficiently specific, nonetheless, if it is determined as a matter of
law that Rule 10b-5 imposes liability for negligence, then the factors
enumerated by the Ninth Circuit in defining the flexible duty stand-
ard will be useful to a jury in evaluating a defendant's conduct to
67
 Id. at 1321 (dissenting opinion).
6' A recent comment on Rule 10b-5 contended that the courts have actually been
applying "a sliding scale lin determining] what constitutes sufficiently diligent conduct to
avoid 10b-5 liability," Mann, Rule 10b-5: Evolution of A Continuum of Conduct To Replace
The Catch Phrases of Negligence And Scienter, 45 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1206, 1209 (1970).
" Lanza v, Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d at 1306 n.98. See text at note 39 supra.
7°
 White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 735-36 (9th Cir. 1974). See text at note it supra.
7' 495 F.2d at 736.
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discover the presence or absence of the degree of care that a particu-
lar fact situation may require. A consideration of the White factors
will help the jury determine what a reasonable man in defendant's
position would have done.
It is submitted that the traditional concept of negligence, de-
veloped by the common law in response to a need for flexibility in
handling a range of fact situations, should be incorporated into the
White standard to satisfy the need for specificity as to the theory of
liability. The federal courts have found the concept of a reasonable
man useful in defining the other principal element of a private
action—materiality72—and there is no reason why this concept may
not be applied in the context of the degree of culpability. This could
be done by defining the general duty imposed upon a defendant by
Rule 10b-5 as that of making a reasonable investigation, and by
requiring the jury to consider the factors enumerated in White when
determining whether a defendant's investigation in a particular case
was reasonable.
In sum, the White factors could, with the addition of the
requirement of a reasonable investigation, provide a suitable stan-
dard for imposing liability under a- negligence theory. However, it is
submitted that it is not permissible to allow the theory of liability in
a private action under Rule 10b-5 to vary from case to case as it will
under the White standard of liability. Not only is it contrary to the
theory of our legal system to allow the jury to determine the law
applicable to a given set of facts, but it is also unfair as a matter of
practice to give those engaged in securities transactions no prospec-
tive guidelines for conforming their behavior to the requirements of
the securities laws. A buyer or seller of securities, in order to know
how thorough an investigation is required of him in a particular
transaction, needs to know whether section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
impose liability on an intent theory or on a negligence theory.
JEFFREY B. STORER
Corporations—Mismanagement—Equitable Principles Applicable
to the issue of Standing—Bangor Punta Operations, inc. v. Bangor
& Aroostook Railroad Co. ' —On October 13, 1964, petitioner Ban-
gor Punta Corp. (Bangor Punta) 2 acquired 98.3% of the outstanding
72
 "A material fact is one to which a reasonable man would attach importance in
determining his choice whether to make the sale or not." Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp, 395, 408
(S.D.N.Y. 1967).
417 U.S. 703 (1974).
2
 Bangor Punta, a Delaware corporation, is a diversified investment company. It effected
this transaction, the subsequent sale of the assets of the Railroad, and the other transactions
forming the basis of the complaint through its wholly-owned subsidiary, petitioner Bangor-
Punta Operations, Inc., a New York corporation. Throughout the litigation, Bangor Punta
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